For each claim estimation, I have evaluated many of the discrete issues presented by such claim, assessed the strengths and weaknesses of each party’s position and what I perceive as risks, considered the evidence presented at the Phase I confirmation hearing, and attempted to estimate a result within the range of likely results. I make no findings of fact or determination of claims in these summary proceedings other than to estimate the claims for purposes of voting and consideration of confirmation of the Plan.

* * *

After considering the record, the qualifications of each expert, and the bases for each of their opinions, I find that the estimated the fair market (reorganization) value of the Rink is $18.5 million and the fair market (reorganization) value of the Land is $19.3 million. I find that the liquidation value of the Land is $14.3 million. I further find that the liquidation value of the ICE property is $11.1 million. While I did not have the benefit of expert testimony establishing that a lower discount rate would be more appropriate for the Rink and Miller’s testimony was somewhat confusing regarding local market participant input and his conclusions, he did ultimately testify that discount rates of 30% and 40% were recommended to him by persons familiar with the local market and that he considered and did not accept those recommendations. I accept his assessment that the specialized nature of the Rink supports a higher discount being applied, but a 50% discount appears too high given the options that Miller considered and that the marketing period seemed arbitrary. The liquidation value of $11.1 million applies a 40% discount to the fair market value of the Rink.

* * *

SHS and CMS have each objected to confirmation on the basis that the Plan Proponents cannot demonstrate that, at least as to Land East, the requirements of § 1129(a)(10) have been met. Section 1129(a)(10) provides that “[i]f a class of claims is impaired under the plan, at least one class of claims that is impaired under the plan has accepted the plan, determined without including any acceptance of the plan by any insider.” 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10). There is a split of authority on how the impaired, accepting class provision of § 1129(a)(10) should be applied in multi-debtor cases where a joint plan is proposed. While not initially framed as a Phase I confirmation issue, whether this objection should be sustained is a legal question of how I construe the requirements of § 1129(a)(10). Resolution of this issue will help guide the parties with respect to confirmation of the Plan.

As acknowledged by the parties, there is no controlling law in the First Circuit and a split of authority among courts that have addressed this question. When applied to plans proposed by multiple debtors, courts have interpreted the requirement of § 1129(a)(10) in two different ways.10 Some courts have held that, where cases are jointly administered, but not substantively consolidated, § 1129(a)(10) requires an impaired but consenting class for each debtor (known as the “per debtor” approach) included in the plan. . . . The contrary view is that § 1129(a)(10) requires only that one class of impaired claims accept the plan, even if that class asserts claims against only one of the debtors (known as the “per plan” approach).

* * *

If the Plan Proponents present evidence that substantive consolidation is appropriate under applicable law, this would permit confirmation of the Plan under either view of § 1129(a)(10). If the evidence at confirmation does not support a finding that substantive consolidation would be appropriate under applicable law outside of the confirmation process, with some reservation and subject to the evidence presented, I will apply the “per plan” approach to evaluate compliance with § 1129(a)(10).

* * *

I have further discretion to decline to enforce the intercreditor voting agreement embodied in the Subordination Agreement. Section 510(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that “[a] subordination agreement is enforceable in a case under this title to the same extent that such agreement is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law.” 11 U.S.C. § 510(a). However, provisions in such an agreement cannot invalidate applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, and I would likely find the voting provision to be unenforceable.

Dugaboy cannot, and does not, point to any direct pecuniary harm. Instead, it argues that Rule 2015.3 grants it standing because the rule is designed to help prepetition creditors provide a complete accounting be-tween the debtor and its non-debtor affiliates. Thus, Dugaboy’s main argument is that, if the bankruptcy court had required Highland to submit reports under Rule 2015.3, Dugaboy could have used that information to dis-cover whether there were any claims against the estate that arose from trans-actions between Highland and its non-debtor affiliates. The mere possibility of harm, however, does not satisfy the person aggrieved standard.

* * *

Even assuming an injury occurred, any potential pecuniary harm to Dugaboy is indirect. Several events would have to occur before money is put back into Dugaboy’s pocket. As the district court aptly explained: “It is un-clear how post-dated reports disclosing years-old facts could lead to any direct recovery by a creditor, let alone recovery by a non-creditor with a purported ownership in non-debtor affiliates.” Thus, the district court properly found that Dugaboy lacked standing.

The question presented by this motion is quite straightforward. The trust is a post-bankruptcy entity. Its original proposal to increase the allowed claims of creditors who transferred their direct claims to the trust would have altered the distribution scheme contemplated by the Bankruptcy Code. That scheme would certainly have required court approval, and there does not appear to be any basis for providing that approval. But unless what a post-bankruptcy entity proposes to do raises questions under the Bankruptcy Code or the terms of the confirmed plan, the entity – whether it is a reorganized debtor or a liquidating trust – does not need court approval.

Lockton’s suggestion in its notice of removal that the trust’s right to bring suit raises questions of federal bankruptcy law or requires a construction of the confirmed plan is incorrect. This Court essentially said as much in connection with its denial of the trustee’s original motion without prejudice. And because the question that Lockton put at issue in seeking to remove the trust’s action to federal court is one regarding the effect or construction of this Court’s confirmation order, there is nothing wrong with the trust returning to this Court to seek clarification. Nothing in the plan of reorganization, the trust agreement, or the Bankruptcy Code stands as an obstacle to the trust acquiring direct claims held by creditors. Lockton’s and Uphold HQ’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive.

* * *

[N]othing in either the July 19, 2022 ruling or any other principle of bankruptcy law would otherwise require a trust to seek or obtain bankruptcy court approval to acquire a creditor’s claim against a third party. Rather, the trust, just like a reorganized debtor, “may go about its business without further supervision or approval.” While formerly subject to court approval whenever it sought to use estate property outside the ordinary course of business, post-bankruptcy entities like reorganized debtors and liquidating trusts are “emancipated by the plan of reorganization.”

There is no dispute that the involuntary petitions were dismissed and that NMI did not waive its rights under §303(i). So, one might expect a claim for attorney’s fees and costs under §303(i)(1) to be resolved through a relatively straightforward process, occurring after the dismissal of the petitions, involving a calculation based on the hours expended, the appropriate hourly rates and the costs incurred by the putative debtors’ attorneys.

But this is no straightforward case.

Since 2008, the parties have engaged in an all-out litigation war on multiple fronts. As a result, in this action under §303(i)(1), to recover attorney’s fees and costs incurred in obtaining dismissal of the 2008 involuntary cases, NMI seeks to recover attorney’s fees totaling $5,122,012.26 and costs in excess of $300.000.00.

As explained below, I have determined that NMI is entitled to recover a substantial portion of the attorney’s fees and costs it seeks, amounting to $2,559,188.15 in attorney’s fees, costs and pre-judgment interest, with the Defendants largely, but not entirely, jointly and severally liable.

However, I am unable to enter a final, appealable judgment at this time. There is one (1) piece of NMI’s §303(i)(1) claim, involving approximately $240,000.00 in requested attorney’s fees, that is not ripe for a decision due to a pending appeal before the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. Thus, the order accompanying this Opinion will not enter judgment, but instead will set out my determination regarding the compensable amount of those fees and costs at issue that are ready to be decided, subject to a potential increase in the award after the conclusion of the Third Circuit appeal. After the appeal is decided, NMI’s §303(i)(1) entitlement can be finalized and the court can enter a final money judgment in NMI’s favor.

The district court erred in holding that Sony failed to satisfy the numerosity requirement. Section 303(b)(1) provides that, where a putative debtor has 12 or more creditors, involuntary bankruptcy proceedings may be initiated against a debtor only by three or more creditors each holding “noncontingent, undisputed claims” in the amount of at least $16,750. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1). Because the parties do not dispute that Priddis has 12 or more creditors, the only question is whether three or more of those creditors hold separate claims.

Here, each of the 14 Petitioning Creditors has a claim to the $3 million judgment, and therefore the Creditors satisfy the numerosity requirement. A claim is a “right to payment, whether or not such a right is reduced to judgment.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). Thus, under the text of § 303(b) and § 101(5), the Petitioning Creditors have “noncontingent, undisputed claims” because the $3 million amount is not in dispute, and, as counsel for Priddis admitted at oral argument, they each have a “right to payment” of some portion of the judgment.

As further explained herein, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the confirmation order in all respects except the following: it determined that certain exculpations in the Plan, as to certain parties, were impermissible pursuant to section 524(e) of the Bankruptcy Code and should be stricken as to those parties. More specifically, the Fifth Circuit held that the only parties properly entitled to Plan exculpations were: the Debtor, the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the “UCC”) and its members, and the “Independent Directors”2 (collectively, the “Properly Exculpated Parties”). The Fifth Circuit then remanded “to the Bankruptcy Court for further proceedings in accordance with the opinion of this Court.

* * *

It is certainly awkward for this court to attempt to be a mind-reader regarding editorial or wordsmithing decisions undertaken by the Fifth Circuit. All this court can be sure of is that the Fifth Circuit declined the Funds' request, in their Motion for Rehearing, to strike or modify the defined term “Protected Parties” (that pertains to the Gatekeeper Provision) so that it would be coterminous with the defined term “Exculpated Parties.” The Fifth Circuit did not modify the Gatekeeper Provision or its applicable definition of “Protected Parties” in any way, let alone in the manner that the Funds requested. And the Fifth Circuit did not include anything in its Final Fifth Circuit Opinion to indicate that the panel agreed with the Funds’ analysis.

* * *

In any event, in light of the Fifth Circuit keeping intact, in its Final Fifth Circuit Opinion, the language that the “the injunction and gatekeeping provisions are sound,” this court sees no need to tailor those provisions in any manner. This tailoring request was made to the Fifth Circuit in the Motion for Rehearing, and they declined.

Knowledge is not implicit here. Rather, the Court previously found SPS violated Plaintiff’s discharge injunction by sending 33 mortgage statements that did not include disclaimers, acknowledgement of the discharge, or any indication that payment was voluntary but, whether SPS had knowledge of the discharge injunction remained to be determined. Plaintiff argues that SPS failed to prove it had no knowledge of the discharge. In the usual case, as previously noted, knowledge is implicit but here that is not the case and to establish knowledge of the discharge injunction is part of Plaintiff’s prima facie case. Fidelity Mortg. Inv. v. Camelia Builders, Inc ., 550 F.2d 47, 52 (2nd Cir . 1976) (“a person is in contempt of court if he knowingly violates a court order, whether or not he received a formal notice.”) Thus, Plaintiff must establish that SPS had knowledge before a finding of contempt can be made. If the order was not entered in a proceeding in which Defendant was a party or otherwise had knowledge of the order, a finding of contempt could not be made because it would run afoul of the principles of fairness recognized in Taggart. The burden to prove why the alleged contemnor was unable to comply with the order at issue only shifts to the alleged contemnor once the plaintiff has fully satisfied her burden of proving civil contempt.

* * *

The Eleventh Circuit has not specifically addressed this issue since Taggart but has, as have other Circuits, noted that actual knowledge is required for an injunction to bind parties and related entities or individuals.

* * *

On the other hand, three Circuit Courts have held that civil contempt requires actual or constructive knowledge rather than actual knowledge. . . . The Court need not determine whether constructive knowledge or actual knowledge is the appropriate standard however, because Plaintiff failed to establish either. As a result, Plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proving the elements of civil contempt and the burden of proof did not shift to SPS to prove lack of knowledge.

There were numerous discovery disputes in this action which caused the Court to enter orders compelling discovery, notably the production of documents. The Court required Ms. Pichler to produce documents to Mr. Tindall, Plaintiffs’ counsel, by July 14, 2014, and if she did not do so, a default judgment would be entered against her upon the filing of an affidavit showing the lack of compliance. Mr. Tindall filed two affidavits attesting to this failure, and the Court entered a default judgment against Ms. Pichler in reliance on those affidavits.

The affidavits, however, later were demonstrated to be false. Ms. Pichler’s new counsel, Kevin Toll, filed numerous pleadings with this Court and the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan detailing the falseness of the affidavits. In particular, it was shown that Ms. Pichler had the documents emailed to Mr. Tindall and also hand delivered a box containing these documents to the post office where Mr. Tindall had a post office box. She did this because Mr. Tindall did not disclose a physical address where she could deliver the documents.

At the risk of getting ahead of the narrative, it developed that Mr. Tindall did handle the box of documents on July 14, 2014, poked a small hole in the box and concluded by seeing the amount of paper in the box that Ms. Pichler did not comply with the Court’s directive. He did not review any paper and instead declined acceptance of the box, so it was returned to Ms. Pichler.

Michelle L. Vieira, the Chapter 7 Trustee (the “Trustee”) objected to the conversion of the case on the grounds that the Motion was filed in bad faith and the case would be subject to immediate conversion back to chapter 7 (the “Objection”). Among other things, the Trustee asserts that the Debtor’s schedules failed to disclose approximately $24,000.00 in anticipated tax refunds; she deceptively scheduled a debt owed to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) of $115,000.00 for unpaid taxes, when it was in fact a debt owed solely by Debtor’s non-filing spouse; her schedules contained numerous errors and inconsistencies; and her income is insufficient to fund a chapter 13 plan.

* * *

The Court acknowledges the seriousness of the inaccuracies and omissions in the schedules and does not condone a debtor’s blind reliance on counsel or family members for their failure to ensure that the information disclosed in schedules, statements, and reports filed with the Court and signed under penalty of perjury are complete, truthful, and accurate. Debtors who make such omissions or testify falsely while under oath should suffer consequences in their bankruptcy case if such omissions or false oaths are made with dishonesty of belief or purpose. The Court also notes that some of the facts in this case are somewhat perplexing and the record before it leaves the Court with some unanswered questions. Under the facts before the Court and the evidence presented, however, the Court finds that the Trustee has not met her burden by a preponderance of the evidence. The Court cannot find that Debtor’s omissions and actions, especially when some of her testimony calls into question whether she was properly counseled on several aspects of the case, were in bad faith. To be clear, that does not preclude any party from seeking any future relief based on Debtor’s conduct as additional facts come to light. Currently, however, there is no evidence before the Court of significant fraudulent conduct that leads the Court to believe the Debtor is attempting to abuse the bankruptcy process.

The sale of Debtor’s home would greatly impact Debtor and her family.20 In a chapter 13 case, Debtor’s unsecured creditors will still receive payment but over a longer period of time. While the Trustee also raises concerns about the Debtor’s ability to confirm a plan, the issue of whether the Debtor will be able to propose a feasible plan may be properly addressed at confirmation. The Court notes that given that the deadline for creditors to file proofs of claim has yet to expire, it is premature at this juncture to know what a chapter 13 plan will propose or how it will be funded.

Appellants do not cite to any case law, let alone binding case law, where notice was required during a hearing for a Rule 9019 motion in order to consider a sale of claims under § 363. In fact, “a bankruptcy court has the discretion to apply § 363 procedures to a sale of claims pursuant to a settlement approved under Rule 9019.”

* * *

Ultimately, the bankruptcy court concluded that “[i]n the circumstances of this case, it is appropriate to apply § 363 procedures to [the] Proposed Settlement. The Trustee entertaining competing bids is procedurally proper and necessary to maximize the recovery of the estate.” The bankruptcy court ruled that “[t]he sale of the Claims to Nan pursuant to the May 16th Offer is in the best interests of creditors and will result in more benefit to the estate than the Proposed Settlement with the McElrath Defendants would have.” Appellants fail to show that they have a strong likelihood of success in the CV 22-307 Appeal.

The Court finds there are no material facts in dispute regarding the narrow issue before it: whether the Agreement is executory. As such, it is ripe for summary judgment. On the date Debtors filed their chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, the Agreement imposed no obligations on Duncan which the failure to perform would constitute a material breach. He had the ongoing option to request a yearly distribution to offset the tax liability created by his interest in the Partnership. Moreover, in the event he wished to transfer his interest in the Partnership, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, the Agreement provided for notice, a right of first refusal, and an obligation for the other partners to consent in writing before any transferee would be treated as a substituted partner. These provisions do not make the Agreement executory, and as such, the failure to assume or reject the Agreement within 60 days does not constitute a rejection as a matter of law under § 365. The Court grants summary judgment in favor of Trustee on the issues of whether the Agreement is an executory contract for purposes of § 365 and whether Trustee was required to assume the Agreement pursuant to § 365.

Trustee also sought summary judgment on the issue of whether the Agreement remains valid and enforceable with regard to the bankruptcy estate’s interest in the Partnership. To the extent the Court’s holding that the Agreement is not executory affects the validity of the Agreement, vis-à-vis the requirement to assume or reject, the Court concludes, as a matter of law, that the Agreement remains valid and enforceable as regards the bankruptcy estate’s interest in the Partnership. As to any other reason the Agreement may not be valid or enforceable as to the estate’s interest, such would be a separate issue which is not presently before the Court.

First, the court is not persuaded that Mr. Frysinger will have sufficient income over the next five years to fund both his reasonably necessary living expenses and the Plan. The IRAs and future Social Security income alone, while helpful, are not sufficient. Mr. Frysinger would also need to work to generate enough income to fund the Plan.

Mr. Frysinger has not held steady full-time employment since at least 2015. The month before his bankruptcy filing, he submitted a declaration to the state court saying his income potential was very difficult to assess with accuracy due to persistent unemployment despite strong efforts to become employed. He attributed this condition to substantial medical issues that would not abate.

Although Mr. Frysinger has earned some sporadic income as an independent contractor during the six months that passed between filing his petition and the confirmation hearing, he did not have steady work during that time.

While the evidence shows Mr. Frysinger may continue to have sporadic work as a caregiver in the future, it does not show Mr. Frysinger could and would obtain enough steady work to generate sufficient income to fund both his living expenses and Plan payments. Mr. Frysinger’s medical conditions have affected his past ability to work, and he did not provide any evidence that his medical condition has improved. Although Mr. Frysinger intends to update his skills and continue seeking technology work, this will take time. Mr. Frysinger’s income from Uber/Lyft is entirely speculative, as he has not yet done any such work at all. In his Schedule I, Mr. Frysinger’s proposed income from Uber/Lyft is only an estimate based on information from Uber’s website and driver forums on the internet.

The fact that Mr. Frysinger is current on his Plan payments does not change the court’s conclusion. Mr. Frysinger was able to make those payments because he withdrew far more funds from his IRAs post-petition than was anticipated on his most recent Schedule J. While Mr. Frysinger is free to use his exempt IRAs as he chooses, the IRAs are not an unlimited resource.

Mr. Frysinger did engage in egregious behavior. When Mr. Frysinger wanted to evade an obligation to pay child support, he filed a declaration with the state court indicating his employment prospects were dim given his significant and on-going mental health issues and long-term trouble finding work. Less than a month later, he filed this chapter 13 case, and is now trying to convince this court of exactly the opposite—that he will be able to make sufficient income from working to fund his reasonably necessary living expenses and Plan payments. Mr. Frysinger provides no convincing explanation for taking these differing positions with differing courts so close in time.

[T]here is no question that this case was filed to defeat state court litigation. This case was filed on the eve of a state court hearing regarding whether Mr. Frysinger should be held in contempt for failure to comply with the dissolution judgment.

* * *

[B]y choosing to file under chapter 13 instead of chapter 7, Mr. Frysinger was attempting to unfairly manipulate the Bankruptcy Code. Mr. Frysinger could have filed a chapter 7 case in good faith—chapter 7 has no income requirement and Mr. Frysinger was in actual financial distress, owing substantial credit card, tax, and other debt.

This matter, which is now ripe for decision, is a spin-off from Plaintiff John J. Tworog’s divorce proceedings that spanned over twelve years and spawned four separate appeals by Mr. Tworog to the Rhode Island Supreme Court. Two of those appeals were resolved unfavorably to Mr. Tworog, and the third and fourth appeals are still pending.

* * *

In his Amended Complaint, Mr. Tworog alleges that Mr. Burke violated the automatic stay when, two days after the petition date, he and Mr. Burke both appeared on October 25, 2018 before the Rhode Island Supreme Court for oral argument in Mr. Tworog’s appeals (the “Appeal Hearing”). Allegedly, Mr. Burke, after being informed by Mr. Tworog that he had filed for bankruptcy and there was an automatic stay in place, proceeded to present his client’s arguments on the merits of the appeal to the court. Mr. Tworog further alleges that the Rhode Island Supreme Court subsequently issued an order declaring, due to the automatic stay, that the hearing had been “invalid and any action that transpired was null and void.” Mr. Tworog also complains that Mr. Burke “did not in any manner seek to void this hearing in which he violated the [automatic stay].”

The gravamen of Mr. Tworog’s Amended Complaint is that: (1) Mr. Burke violated the automatic stay by proceeding with his merits argument before the Rhode Island Supreme Court after the filing of Mr. Tworog’s bankruptcy petition; (2) this violation was willful because Mr. Burke knew of the pending bankruptcy case and the automatic stay; and (3) this violation caused him “pain and suffering and mental anguish” for which he should be awarded $100,000 in damages.

* * *

Mr. Tworog latches on to that portion of Mr. Burke’s testimony in which he responded that he followed the directives of the justices and presented substantive argument to the Rhode Island Supreme Court on the merits of the appeals. But in doing so Mr. Tworog ignores his own effective demonstration of the unreliability of such testimony because of Mr. Burke’s dementia and the mental confusion it caused him during the trial. Throughout the trial the Court was fully able to observe Mr. Burke’s demeanor. He seemed somewhat dazed and his speech was noticeably slow. His first responses to Mr. Tworog’s questioning—that he advised the Rhode Island Supreme Court that he did not want to proceed because of the automatic stay and his fear of being accused of violating it if he presented argument on the merits of the appeal—is consistent with all of his pre-trial filings, his answers to interrogatories, and his arguments to this Court. It is also fully harmonious with what Mr. Welch and Ms. Ash testified occurred at the Appeal Hearing. The Court attributes Mr. Burke’s inconsistent statement, that he presented his client’s case on the merits, to his dementia and resulting confused mental state. Based on the entire record, the Court does not find Mr. Burke credible in that regard and affords that statement little weight.

[T]he Trustee and Rutan Parties, and their filing of the supplemental objection, are not the main source of the delays in these proceedings. The structure of Johns’ IRA—a “self-directed,” multi-tiered Roth IRA that owns interests in at least two trusts which, in turn, own interests in other assets and businesses— conceals any understanding of how his IRA can be worth $250,000 (or more) when he has contributed only $19,000 to the IRA. Plus, Johns’ bankruptcy schedules reveal an individual that is virtually destitute. Yet, according to Johns, he is able to leverage an innate ability to find good deals for his IRA and, apparently, for other individuals who are willing to front hundreds of thousands of dollars in return for roughly half of any gains realized from the many deals and transactions within the trusts and trust assets. The Trustee and Rutan Parties had to obtain facts supporting their objection through extensive discovery. Undue delay is not a factor weighing against amending the Trustee’s and Rutan Parties’ objection to exemptions.

* * *

Both the original and supplemental objections concern Johns’ IRA that he claims as exempt under § 522(d)(12).10 The original and supplemental objections are premised upon the charge that the IRA benefited from excess contributions and engaged in prohibited transactions, thus disqualifying the IRA as an exempt asset under § 522(d)(12).

The supplemental objection adds facts to support the charges of excessive contributions and prohibited transactions. It states that the initial funding of the IRA was an excess contribution based on Johns’ reported income. Relatedly, the supplemental objection alleges outside sources made excess contributions to the IRA by funding the trusts in which the IRA owns an interest. Id. at 6. The supplemental objection provides a rough outline of how the trusts acquired several properties, thus allegedly contributing to the IRA. Turning to the prohibited-transaction argument, the supplemental objection alleges many additional prohibited transactions took place when the trusts, owned in part by Johns’ IRA, engaged in transactions with disqualified persons.

The facts and relationships surrounding the transactions are murky. The supplemental objection provides some clarity to those facts and relationships. Regarding Johns’ concern for discovery, he is, as the debtor, the one best equipped to obtain discovery—he has an equitable interest in these entities, which in turn are obligated to him. Johns is not unduly prejudiced by the Trustee’s and Rutan Parties’ supplemental objection.

* * *

The only way the amendment is not futile is if it relates back to the date of the timely-filed original objection. Rule 15 states “[a]n amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when … the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted to be set out—in the original pleading[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B).

Both the supplemental objection and the original objection concern Johns’ claimed exemption of his IRA under § 522(d)(12). The base conduct complained of is the same— excessive contributions and prohibited transactions. The supplemental objection adds facts to support the objection, facts that were discovered after the original objection. The supplemental objection concerns the same property, the IRA. The Court concludes the supplemental objection relates back to the date of the original objection and is thus not futile, despite being brought after the deadline for objecting to exemptions under Bankruptcy Rule 4003(b).